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Abstract 
Traditionally, budgeting has been the process through which governments decide how much to 
spend on what, limiting expenditures to the revenues available and preventing overspending. Over 
time, budgeting has increasingly been expected to perform different roles and functions, 
becoming an important political medium, a tool for providing impulses to the economy and the 
society, a fundamental governance and management device, and a central accountability channel. 
This multiplicity of functions has translated into a variety of budget formats and bases, and in 
increasingly complex budgeting processes.  
This chapter aims to discuss how budgeting has been practiced and studied over the last 
few decades by looking at the evolution of public budget functions, formats and processes over 
time, and the related implications and challenges for practice, policy and research.  
7.1 Introduction 
Public budgets play a central role in public organizations and the economy. A large share of 
Europe’s GDP is managed through public budgets, whereby public expenditure in European 
countries averagely accounts for around 50% of GDP (OECD, 2014).   
Interestingly, public budgeting appears to be an umbrella-term, used to refer alternatively 
to a set of documents as well as the decision-making processes and related procedures that 
surround them. Traditionally, budgeting has been the process through which governments decide 
how much to spend on what, limiting expenditures to the revenues available and preventing 
overspending. However, public budgets are also tools for bargaining and allocating power and 
resources, for planning and controlling, for providing impulses to the economic and social 
environment, and for ensuring transparency and stakeholder involvement. It is not surprising, 
then, that public budgets and budgeting are the subject of enduring interest by different 
disciplines, each focusing on specific facets, functions and features of public budgets, and 
somewhat suggesting partial views of the related processes, contents and phenomena. Similarly, 
in practice, budgeting processes involve different actors (politicians, managers, accountants, 
economists, etc.), each with their own cultures, perceptions, expectations and professional norms.  
This chapter is aimed at exploring, reflecting and highlighting public budgets multifaceted 
nature and the related implications and challenges for practice, policy and research by taking into 
specific account European developments and trends. In this vein, it first discusses budget 
functions, focusing on their roles from political, managerial, accountability and economic 
perspectives. It then looks at public budgets as “documents”, exploring how these functions are 
reflected in different formats, bases and principles. Subsequently, it explores budgeting as 
processes, pointing to the continuous evolution of approaches to understand and at the same 
time shape budgetary decision-making. Finally, it addresses the possible future challenges for 
practitioners and researchers interested in public budgeting.  
 
7.2 The functions of public budgeting 
Public budgets were first created to ensure that no revenues could be raised (and no taxation 
could be imposed on constituents) without the approval of the constituents’ representatives, and 
that the latter could decide on the use of such public resources. Thus, they were aimed at 
authorizing the spending of public money, ensuring compliance through budget execution and 
reporting, ultimately guaranteeing accountability on the decisions as well on the actual use of 
public resources. As such, public budgets list public sector entities’ revenues and expenditures, 
and generally limit the amount of the latter to the amount of the former, to ensure balance. Also, 
for each budgetary item (appropriation), they constrain the amount to be spent, ie, during budget 
execution expenditures will not exceed budgetary appropriations.  
Public budgets and budgeting processes in Western Europe and the US developed their modern 
composition and form between the mid-19th century and the end of WW II (Krause, 2012). Over 
the years, budgets have increased both their size and scope, and today they can be described as 
important political media, fundamental governance and management devices, central 
accountability channels, and important tools for providing impulse to the economy and society. 
Budgets play a fundamental political function in that (Rubin, 2010: 1-2) they show what 
governments and other public sector entities are going to do, with which priorities, and how they 
plan to fund it. As such, on the one hand they reflect stakeholders’ preferences and priorities, and 
their relative power positions. On the other, budgets reflect the final compromise of long decision 
making processes, where different interests and priorities are brought to the table, as well as the 
starting point for future discussions and bargaining (Wildavsky, 1964). The political function is 
probably the one that has traditionally attracted more attention in practice and in scholarly 
debates and has especially formed the subject of enduring interest by political scientists. The 
political function of the budget is reflected first and foremost in its centrality in the budgetary 
cycle as well as the requirement for it to be publicly accessible, which stands in stark contrast with 
what happens in the private sector, where it is rather financial statements that occupy the center 
stage, and budgets are not generally disclosed to the public. Second, the political function of the 
budget significantly affects the form of budgetary processes (eg. procedural aspects, roles and 
responsibilities of key actors, executive-legislative relationships) and is also reflected in specific 
features of the format of public budgets, such, as, for example, the specific importance taken on 
by expenditure breakdown by destination (be it functions, programs, missions, etc.) as opposed to 
its classification by nature. Indeed, the destination of spending will clearly suggest where the 
political priorities stand in terms of choosing among competing policy areas.  
The political function of budgets is strongly intertwined with their external accountability 
function. The separation between who pays for taxes and who decides how to spend the money 
raised through taxations implies that governments should be held accountable for what they 
spend as well as for the efficiency and effectiveness of programs and services delivered. 
Accountability is attained on the one hand through the clarity, accessibility, readability and 
comprehensiveness of budgetary documents, which will include not only the initial budgets, but 
also the revised ones, and the budgetary reports (showing compliance with budgets). On the other 
hand, it is to be attained by making budgeting processes transparent and understandable to 
stakeholders, or by increasingly involving stakeholders. Rubin (2010) observes that governments 
may be more or less willing to display their own choices on public expenditures and programmes. 
On the one hand they may be inclined to external communication for leveraging the 
announcement effect and increase their level of consensus. On the other, they may exhibit a 
certain reluctance to avoid raising expectations of the community about the results to be achieved 
or to attract the attention of those stakeholders who, being against specific budgetary choices, 
may contrast them. The external accountability function has traditionally been the subject of 
attention both from political scientists and law scholars. Increasingly, it has attracted the attention 
of public management and accounting scholars too, heedful to the accountability implications of 
budgetary reforms. As such, questions about whether and how cash- or accruals- based formats, 
or performance based budgeting, or participatory budgeting, can increase the transparency of 
budgets have become and continue to be the subject of heated debate.  
Public budgets also play an important managerial function, in that they facilitate the attainment of 
mission and strategies set forth by governments and public sector entities, by holding public 
managers accountable for their results and the use of resources. Indeed, public budgets enable 
“the programming of approved goals into specific projects and activities, the design of 
organizational units to carry out approved programs, and the staffing of these units and the 
procurement of necessary resources” (Schick, 1966, 244). This function has very often been the 
weakest, as traditionally in the public sector greater importance was attached to the formal 
respect of spending constraints, which may also have diverted managers’ attention from result 
orientation. However, the managerial function of the budget has entered the spotlight in the wake 
of managerial movements of reforms (Hood, 1991, 1995), which, in the pursuit of stronger 
organizational as well as managerial autonomy, accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, value for 
money, output- orientation, have promoted significant changes in the traditional budget formats 
and processes. This has translated, as will be shown below, into a trend to adopt accruals-based 
budgets, or performance-based ones. Along similar lines, managerial reforms have often 
translated into a stronger distinction between budgets defined at the political and managerial 
levels. The managerial function of budgets has attracted in particular the attention of public 
management and accounting scholars, who have been particularly interested in understanding 
how new budget formats and processes have been used to strengthen and clarify managerial 
responsibilities, to improve service provision, and to introduce result-orientation, being influenced 
by but ultimately also affecting administrative culture (see also Anessi et al., 2016).   
Finally, public budgets perform three main economic functions (Musgrave and Musgrave 
1989). The allocative function of public budgeting refers to defining the boundaries of public 
sector involvement in the economy, i.e. the shares of an economy controlled by governments and 
by the private sector. The distributive function refers to public budgets defining how the sacrifices 
and benefits will be distributed among the different categories of actors, giving rise to the never-
ending and not-easily decipherable debate about the extent to which governments should try to 
remedy the inequalities between the citizens (see also Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989). Finally, the 
budget plays a function of stabilization, in that governments use the budget as an instrument of 
macroeconomic management with the expectation to improve the overall economic performance 
and to anticipate as well as mitigate economic downturns (e.g., in terms of rate of employments, 
economic growth, level of inflation). It is worth noticing that the economic functions have become 
especially central in the middle of the last century, becoming increasingly intertwined with the 
political one (i.e. budgets as fiscal policies). As such, it is reflected in types of expenditure 
classification that reflect potential impacts on the economy and on society, such as breakdown by 
function. Also, it finds expression in fiscal rules and indicators, through which States, as well as 
international or supra-national institutions try to increase fiscal performance or enhance fiscal 
discipline. In Europe fiscal rules were introduced at the supra-national level with the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty, which established numerical entry criteria to the Economic and Monetary 
Union. The Maastricht numerical fiscal rules were further strengthened and clarified in the 
Stability and Growth Pact (1997). Since then, and in particular as a consequence of the fiscal crisis, 
the latter has seen a number of revisions and reforms (e.g. Six-Pack, Two Pack, and Fiscal 
Compact). Among others, these requirements have resulted in changes of time horizons of 
budgets, ie the introduction of medium-term planning frameworks with fixed ceilings, aimed at 
ensuring a stable and sustainable fiscal position in the medium term and beyond. In Europe, they 
have also contributed to re-shape the roles of budgets as tools for mediating the relationship 
between the EU and the member states.  It is thus not surprising that the economic function has 
been mostly investigated by economists, and that in the Offices of Budget and Treasury, especially 
at the central states’ level, macro-economic competencies are strongly represented.  
A review (Anessi et al., 2016) highlights that the studies of European public budgeting 
published in Accounting and Public Administration journals between the 80ies and the first decade 
of the XXI century mostly focused on the managerial function of budgeting, with a slight increase 
in the attention towards its external accountability role since the ‘90ies. This appears to reflect the 
importance taken on by the managerial (NPM) wave of reforms.  
The multi-faceted nature of the public budget functions translates into different 
architectures when it comes to shaping public budgets as documents (including choices as to the 
classification of items and principles of preparation) and public budgeting as processes (with the 
related implications in terms of steps, involved actors, relevant responsibilities, and time lines).  
 
7.3 Public budgets as documents 
The budget is a document or a collection of documents that define the amount of resources 
available to fund expenditures in a given period of time, usually consisting of one financial year. As 
documents, public budgets can take significantly different formats and will generally be required 
to respect a number of budgetary principles. Defining budget formats and principles is not merely 
a technical issue as it may influence the analysis and discussion underlying budgetary decision, the 
level of accountability and transparency, the way in which responsibilities are allocated among 
actors within political and administrative sides of governments. In this respect, as Grizzle (1986: 
60-61) observes:  
‘In thinking about how the organization of data might affect budget decision it is useful to 
conceptualize a two-step process. In the first step, the format in which the proposed budget 
is cast would influence the content of discussion that budget makers hold during the budget 
review process. […] In the second step, the content of budget deliberations, that is, “the 
nature of budgetary discourse”; would influence the budget decisions that determine how 
much money is appropriated for what purpose.’ 
 
7.4 Budget formats 
The traditional format of public budget is the line-item one, whereby revenues and expenditures 
are classified by nature, ie, the former are classified into specific categories that mirror their 
character such as taxes and fees, and the latter are classified so as to inform on the type of 
resources which are going to be used and deployed, including personnel, goods and services, 
interests. Each expenditure category is listed on a separate line of the budget document and 
budget approval authorizes the actual spending within the budgeted limits. Categories can be 
defined broadly (for instance contrasting operating and capital expenditures) or can be broken 
down in many detailed items (further disaggregating both operating and capital expenditures), 
thus reducing the discretion that is left to the executive branch of government and operating 
managers. The line-item budget is in tune with the traditional model of public administration 
because of its potential to closely monitor and limit spending by the execution through the 
detailed specification of input. However, it does not provide information on what is spent. Several 
consequences of the missing link between inputs and programs/outputs might be identified. First, 
this kind of structure of the budget tends to downplay competition during budget formulation, 
discussion and approval because it makes it difficult to understand and compare the programs and 
actions that the government as a whole and its departments want to realize (Rubin, 2010; 
Wildavsky, 1978). Second, line-item budget it is not able to promote efficient and effective 
planning of public spending thus facilitating an incremental approach to definition of expenditures 
(Shah and Shen, 2007). Third, this type of classification shows a low level of accountability towards 
external stakeholders that may be expected to be more interested in what activities money is 
spent on instead of how money is spent. Forth, line-item budget encourages public managers to 
focus their attention during budget execution more on expenditure ceiling rather than the 
performance of their activities.  
To overcome these shortcomings of the line- item format, several reforms have tried to 
modify budget formats with the aim of strengthening its planning, accountability and managerial 
functions. This has led, among others things, to compound information on the nature of expected 
expenditure with information on their purposes. The concept of “purpose” has been 
operationalized in terms of administrative units, programs, performance and functions. Each 
format of the budget by purpose serves different functions and has several pros and cons, 
discussed below and summed up in Table 7.1. 
Expenditure is classified by organizational units when the aim is to emphasize financial 
control and assign the related responsibilities. This kind of structure of the budget, together with 
line item appropriations, tends to play down competition during budget formulation, discussion 
and approval because it makes it difficult to understand and compare the programs and actions 
that the government as a whole and its departments want to realize (Rubin, 2010; Wildavsky, 
1978). This type of classification shows a low-to-medium level of accountability towards external 
stakeholders that may be expected to be more interested in what activities money is spent on 
instead of organizational distribution of responsibilities. This format might entail problems of 
comparison of data over time and space as organization structures differ among governments and 
change over time.  
The classification of expenditure appropriations by programs is typical of program budgets. 
In program budgets appropriations are shown according to activities that the government intends 
to realize in order to achieve specific objectives (programs), often with a multi-annual time span. 
This classification is expected to ensure a link between long-term planning and the annual budget. 
It is also consistent with the role of legislators that are responsible for representing interests and 
overseeing public expenditures and their underlying strategies and priorities. Moreover, it 
provides external stakeholders with the information they may seek as it highlights the priorities 
set by the governments. The change of political programs would also change the structure of the 
budget, with obvious consequences on the possibility of comparing data over time and space.  
Performance budgets reflect government inputs and the related results to be achieved. 
This format is similar to the program budged, with the exception that in performance budget 
expenditures per each program are complemented with information related to the expected 
results. Results can be qualified as outputs (quantity and quality of activities and services 
provided), efficiency (cost per unit of outputs), outcomes (immediate impacts of outputs) and 
effectiveness (ratio between outputs and outcomes). Performance budgets mainly pursue 
managerial and accountability functions, with the outcome budget being even higher on 
accountability as compared to output budget. Indeed, it has been defined (Martin, 2002, 249) as 
"external-stakeholder friendly". Performance budgets, similarly to program budgets, make it 
difficult to compare results within the same government over time and between agencies (see 
Carlin, 2006). In general, the integration of financial information with non-financial information in 
budgets has been a widespread trend in Europe since the introduction of NPM reforms, reaching 
its peak in the early 2000s. Interestingly, Northern European States (Norway, Finland, and Sweden) 
have been among the first-movers in this regard, starting their initiatives in the late 1980s.  
According to OECD/World Bank survey carried out in 2007/2008 over 75% of the responding 97 
countries across the world (and around 80% of today’s 28 EU member) states incorporate 
performance information in their budgets or budget processes (see also Willoughby 2014), 
although a high variety in the maturity of approaches is shown1. In this context, studies also show 
that there is a tendency of countries to introduce initially output budgets and later outcome 
budgets (for instance Denmark and Netherlands) and to avoid mechanical links between 
performance results and decision on the allocation of resources, with cut or elimination of 
resources allocated to those programs that fail to meet performance targets (Curristine, 2005).   
Finally, the budget can also be structured to reflect how money is spent on each function 
that governments are expected to carry out. This classification allows comparisons on expenses on 
particular functions between countries/governments and over time, mainly providing information 
for analyzing the economic functions of budgets. The COFOG (Classification of the Functions of 
Government) is the clearest example of classification by functions. It was developed in 1984 by the 
United Nation and modified in 1999. The latest version has been adopted by Eurostat to collect 
data on general government expenditure of EU members. COFOG classifies government 
expenditure with three levels of detail: divisions; groups; classes. In particular, the ten divisions 
describe the broad socio-economic functions of government (general public services, defense, 
public order and safety, economic affairs, environmental protection, housing and community 
affairs, health, recreation, culture and religion, education, social protection), while groups and 
classes represent subcategories (e.g. pre-primary education) within the respective division (e.g. 
education). With the introduction of ESA 2010 the provision of data at the group level has become 
                                                          
1 For more details it is possible to visit the OECD International Database of Budget Practices and Procedures, at 
www.oecd.org/gov/budget/database 
compulsory for all EU member states therefore allowing more detailed comparisons across 
countries.  From a political and managerial point of view its weaknesses however refer to its feeble 
link to strategic and operational plans and responsibilities as well as the specific aims that an 
organization wants to achieve with respect to the generic functions is responsible for.  
 
7.5 The “basis” of budgeting: cash or accruals? 
The appropriations included in the budget can be expressed using different bases of accounting, 
with the cash and the accrual bases representing the two ends of a spectrum of different 
alternatives (including modified cash and accruals systems, or commitment based ones) (Jones 
and Pendlebury, 2010). Traditionally the basis of accounting and budgeting of government has 
been cash. Cash-based budget shows the estimated collections on the revenues side and expected 
payments on the expenditure side. During the year, then, revenues are recorded when cash is 
actually received, whereas expenditures are recorded when they are actually paid. The main 
advantages of cash-basis accounting and budgeting are its objectiveness and simplicity. However, 
several disadvantages have been recognized. The main are the following: lack of information on 
income and costs (that may be relevant even for governments) as well as on assets and liabilities; 
distortion of the real expenditures and revenues of a fiscal year as consequence of the fact that 
values that do not result in cash transactions are not recorded; manipulations in budget execution 
as collections and payments can be speeded up or slowed down. In the wake of NPM reforms 
attempts have been made to replace the traditional cash basis with the accrual basis both for 
accounting and financial reporting and for budgeting. Under accrual accounting, revenues are 
recorded when earned and expenditures when a liability is incurred regardless of when cash flows 
take place. This different basis of accounting and budgeting is claimed to have a number of 
advantages In this respect, several authors, specifically focusing on the UK's "Resource accounting 
and budgeting" (RAB) initiative, have pointed out this benefits of accrual-based budgeting: better 
information and incentives to manage assets; better incentives in planning investments and, more 
generally, a new impetus to bring under control the sustainability of public finances by highlighting 
the long-term consequences of current decisions. However, the introduction of accrual-based 
budgets raises some critical issues as well, such as the accounting treatment of specific operations 
and items, including nonreciprocal revenues, pension liabilities and entitlements (Gillibrand and 
Hilton 1998; Likierman, 1998; Likierman 2003; Hepworth 2003; Adam and Behn 2006), the 
implications on the amount of cash to be appropriated of the inclusion of non-cash items under an 
accrual framework (is cash appropriated for the full accrual amounts, including non-cash items 
such as depreciation?) (Blöndal 2004), the rise of creative accounting (Perrin 1998), the need to 
enable non-accountants to understand and use the new information (Likierman, 2000). However, 
in practice, in the second decade of the 21st century a full move to the accruals basis of budgeting 
has not yet (?) taken place. For example, the majority of European countries have not opted for 
accruals appropriations, even when most of them have implemented accrual accounting and/or 
reporting (see chapter 8 in this book), substituting or complementing cash-based accounting 
and/or reporting (Table 7.1). This is also the solution implemented by the European Union that 
elaborates its budget on cash accounting principles, whereas the accounting system recognizes 
revenues and expenditures according to both the cash basis and the accrual basis and financial 
report includes both cash- and accrual-based statements. These hybrid solutions in which both 
cash and accrual bases are used in various combinations along all the budgetary cycle or only in 
some stages mirror a compromise that appears far from being beneficial, given that might 
produces confusion in politician and managers providing them with conflict and not-comparable 
information (see also Guthrie, 1998).  
 
Table 7.1  Budgeting and Accounting in European Central Governments  
 FINANCIAL REPORTING 
(Modified) Cash (Modified) Accrual 
BUDGETING 
(Modified) Cash (Albania) §  
(Bosnia) § 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Germany 
Ireland  
Italy 
Luxembourg 
(Macedonia) §  
Malta 
Netherlands 
(Norway)§ 
(Serbia)§  
Slovenia 
(Ukraine)§ 
 
 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
France  
Greece 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania  
(Montenegro) § 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Spain 
 
(Modified) Accrual  Austria  
Denmark 
Finland 
Estonia 
 (Iceland)§ 
Sweden 
(Switzerland)§ 
United Kingdom 
Source: Brusca et. al. (2015),  Christiaens et. al. (2014), Ernst and Young (2012), Moretti (2016) and authors’ 
Elaboration (Country)§ = Non EU member 
 
7.6 Budget principles 
Irrespective of how appropriations are presented, budgets are generally required to comply with a 
number of principles, including: transparency, whereby information on the budget and its 
implementation must be publicly available; unit of account, as the budget must be drawn up and 
implemented in one currency; annuality, as the budget generally refers to one financial year; 
universality, as all revenues and expenditures are included in the budget; unity, whereby all 
revenues contribute to covering all expenditures. Another fundamental principle governing 
budgeting is the requirement that budget should balance revenues to expenditure, or that 
budgeted deficits should not exceed a given threshold.   
In this respect, some empirical evidence does exist that budgets are often optimistic or 
pessimistic in that expected budgeted revenues and expenditures are often over- or under-
estimated, giving rise to bias in budgeting and the subsequent emergence of surpluses or deficits. 
A certain degree of inaccuracy in forecasting is considered unavoidable, due to the presence of 
uncertainty about the future (Rubin 1987). Inaccuracies, however, may be intentional (Larkey and 
Smith, 1989), with budgets reporting something different from what is suggested by the models 
and data at their disposal. Several explanations for intentional budget bias are identified. The 
benefits of intentional misrepresentation at the budgetary stage, however, can be short-lived. 
Indeed, during the fiscal year, actual revenues and expenditure will emerge as different from the 
budgeted ones, forcing immediate actions to be taken, for example in terms of downward revision 
of spending, or the necessity to cover a deficit in the following years. A recent study of Italian 
municipalities by Anessi and Sicilia (2015) suggests that overestimations of current revenues are 
more frequent than underestimations, during both budget formulation and budget execution, and 
that they are associated with political orientation and fiscal stress 
 
7.7 Budgeting as process 
When looking at public budgeting as a collection of processes, it is necessary to recognize that the 
budgetary cycle is not restricted to the budget formulation, ie the process through which decisions 
are taken on the expenditures, the revenues and the budget is approved, but also includes budget 
execution and reporting. This integrated view is crucial for ensuring political and administrative 
accountability along the process. One important feature in public budgeting is therefore the 
obligatory and publicly available comparison of budgeted and actual amounts (e.g. revenues, 
expenditures, programs, performance indicators), which ensures budget execution control. As the 
political-administrative process is tailored around budget preparation, budget execution and 
reporting appear to have attracted less attention in research and practice. A few studies, however, 
have shown the relevance of considering these elements. During budget execution, public budgets 
can be significantly modified, and thus initial budgeting and budget execution must be viewed as 
the components of a yearlong process. More specifically, as shown by Anessi et al (2012) in a study 
of Italian municipalities, budget formulation and re-budgeting during the year tend to be 
complementary, ie, the more a policy has been incorporated into the initial budget, the less it 
needs to be pursued through re-budgeting.  
Budgetary processes are generally regulated by laws or rules referring to how the different 
phases develop, who the actors involved are, with which powers, as well as the degree of publicity 
of such processes. Beyond these legal perspectives, in particular the stage of budget preparation 
comprises complex decision making processes, where interests and priorities of multiple actors 
are brought to the table and where "who gets what, how and why" is not only dependent on 
rational decisions, technical rules and procedures, but also on past decisions, relative power 
relationships, alliances, bargains, the politics of the process and changes in the environment 
(Wildavsky, 1964: 322; Wildavsky, 1992). Along these lines, the history of budgeting research and 
practice displays a succession of phases as well as a continuous tension between opposites such as 
incremental and comprehensive (rational) processes, growth and decline, centralization and 
decentralization, as well as macro and micro-oriented processes (Caiden, 2010). 
The incremental dimension of budgeting processes has been emphasized by several scholars (e.g. 
Wildavsky 1964, Caiden, 2010), becoming a mainstream explanation for budgeting processes in 
the US and also in Western Europe (van Nispen, 2011) after WWII. In terms of budgetary outputs, 
incrementalism broadly reflects decisions that use last year’s budgets to develop this year’s 
budgets by making marginal adjustments resulting in stable patterns over time. In terms of 
budgetary processes, incrementalism has been seen as a way to simplify budget decisions and to 
reduce conflict over decisions related to the allocation of money, making budgeting more 
comprehensible and predictable, where the involved actors largely know the results in advance 
(Andersen and Mortensen, 2009). Although incrementalism has been considered as one of the 
most powerful descriptions of real-life budgeting processes, it has been also significantly criticized 
as it may result in conservatism, short-termism and the support of existing coalitions and policies 
(Rainey 2009, Rubin 1989). Moreover, its explanatory power is considered to be limited to specific 
environmental conditions (i.e. a stable and growing economy), to a specific type of budget (i.e. 
line-item budgeting) and to a specific type of process (i.e. bottom-up process) (Rubin 1989), where 
the budgeting power is concentrated in the knowledge of the executive branch and agency heads 
drive budget decisions (micro-budgeting) while politicians only discuss the increments from an 
already existing budgeting base. As a result, budgets should remain stable. This pattern is often 
found; for example, according to Barracclough and Dorotinsky (2008), in most OECD countries, the 
legislature approves the executive budget proposal without major changes, ie, less than 3 percent. 
However, an increasing number of empirical studies revealed that budgets are occasionally 
punctuated by large shifts in budget positions (Jones et. al. 2009), thereby suggesting that 
punctuated equilibrium theory may prove a useful alternative theory in explaining budgeting 
outputs over time. According to proponents of this theory, stability is interrupted by significant 
variations caused by important changes in society, politics, institutions and the economy 
(Baumgartner et al, 1998). While incremental approaches to budgeting therefore have to be 
acknowledged as one trait of budgeting, they seem to be rather suited to continue a stable past 
into a predictable future, while falling short of shaping the future directions of government or 
society (Schick, 2004) or dealing effectively with environmental challenges.   
Historically, there have often been efforts to make budgeting processes more rational and 
to improve the quality of budget decisions by altering budget formats, providing richer 
information on financial and non-financial performance of public programs and services, changing 
decision making processes and responsibilities as well as timeframes. The critique of 
incrementalism, traditional budget formats and the budget power of the executive have also given 
rise to reform movements such as those taking place in the ‘60ies and ‘70ies, that aimed at 
increasing the comprehensiveness and rationality of budgeting processes. Planning and 
programming approaches (e.g. Planning, Programming, Budgeting Systems, Zero-based 
budgeting), inspired by trust in centralized and top-down processes and a strong focus on the 
economic function of budgeting, were adopted in the US and several European countries (e.g. 
Italy, France, Belgium, Sweden, Germany).  Due to technological, organizational and political 
reasons, however, these approaches were never fully implemented or were abandoned, 
particularly in the face of the late ‘70ies crisis and related austerity. Indeed, the 1970ies and early 
1980ies witnessed the emergence of “decrementalism”, ie, the translation of incrementalism 
under constrained resources, expressed as ‘equity cuts’ and sharing the pain among units.  
However, this translation goes beyond merely mirroring incrementalism since it happens in less 
stable environments and generates more conflict (Schick, 1983). Acknowledging the latter resulted 
in a need to not only discuss the margins of public budgets but to adopt – again - more 
“comprehensive and rational approaches” (taking a multiyear time frame, implementing a 
comprehensive re-examination of mission and structure and involving a significant reallocation of 
resources), that have been described in the rich cutback management literature (Levine, 1978, 
1979, 1985; Hood and Wright 1980, Schick, 1980). The latter disappeared (for a long time), but 
probably paved the way for the latest rationalization phase, under NPM. More specifically, 
budgeting under NPM focuses on decentralized and managerial decision-making and relies on a 
strong confidence on the effectiveness of technical-rational approaches. In particular, the use of 
performance information throughout the budgeting processes and in budget documents is 
considered as a crucial element in achieving better decisions and in enhancing the efficiency, 
effectiveness and accountability of public organizations. This emphasis has partially been displaced 
in the face of the global financial crisis, whereby, especially in Europe, new attention has been 
given to the definition and enforcement of fiscal rules, supra-national control over budgeting, 
while new attention to cutback management and austerity (re-)emerged in practice and in the 
literature (for example, Peters, 2011; Raudla et al., 2013; Bracci et al., 2015; Kickert and Randma-
Liiv, 2015). Thus, it can be concluded that approaches to budgeting will tend to sediment over 
time, giving rise to unique combinations of rules and routines that continuously evolve in a path 
dependent way.  
However, it may be pointed out that NPM appears to have played a major role in affecting 
both the features of budgeting and related research between the end of the XX century and the 
beginning of the XXI. Indeed, a review of public sector budgeting in Accounting and Public 
Management journals (Anessi et al. 2016) shows that the majority of papers on public budgeting 
(61 out of 83) refer to NPM as a context or even a conceptual lens to read budgetary reforms. 
Interestingly, strong reliance on NPM literature may have temporarily displaced attention from 
the development of theories of public budgeting in Europe, but appears to have been conducive to 
the accumulation of rich descriptive contextual evidence on public sector reforms in different 
countries and the related changes in budgeting regimes. This, in turn, may provide the basis for 
the development of more advanced theories of public budgeting, which explain not only variation 
across space, but also over time. Indeed, the review shows that over time the papers have become 
theoretically more sophisticated, probably reflecting an evolution whereby the initial exploration 
of practices and reforms has paved the way for conceptually stronger analyses.  
However, there is still a lack of research with regard to the impact of changes in budget 
formats on budgeting processes. In Europe, only a few scholars have analyzed the use of 
performance information in budgeting processes and their impact on the roles and responsibilities 
of politicians and managers (e.g. Raudla 2011). These studies also revealed that performance 
information in budgeting processes is mainly used for presentational/informational purposes 
without changing the accountability relationship between the legislative and executive branch. 
Although the results are not surprising for various and well documented reasons (e.g. Schick, 2007, 
Wildavsky, 1978), they point to a general weakness of reforms which are mainly based on 
technical-rational assumptions and ignore the political and cultural surrounding context. Technical 
tools can, in principle, support better decision making, however they are also shaped by, and in 
turn also influence organizational, psychological, economic, social and political contexts (Liguori 
and Steccolini, 2014). Table 7.2 sums up the evolutions in the main functions and features of 
public budgeting over time.  
 
Table 7.2 Evolutions in public budgeting  
 DOMINANT 
FUNCTIONS 
FORMATS PROCESSES 
Traditional PA before 
II WW 
Political and (internal) 
accountability 
Focus: budgetary 
compliance 
Detailed Line-Item 
Budgets 
Cash-based budgets 
Incrementalism 
Post-war expansion  
1950-1970 
Political and (internal) 
accountability function  
Economic functions 
Focus: impact on the 
Economy 
 
Line item (broader 
categories)  
Programme Budgets 
Budgets by functions 
Cash based budgets 
Incrementalism 
Programme budgeting as 
antidote to incrementalism  
Austerity (I) and 
cutback management 
1970-1980 
(Internal) accountablity 
function  
Economic functions  
Focus: expenditure 
control 
Line-item or programme 
budget 
Cash based budgets 
Decrementalism 
Top down budgeting 
Cutback management 
Spending reviews 
 
NPM  
1980s -  
Managerial Function 
Accountability Function 
Focus: performance; 
value for money 
Budgets by 
organizational units 
Performance Budgets 
Accruals based budgets 
Strategic and rational 
processes 
Linking resources with results 
Austerity (II)  (External) accountability Budgets by Fiscal Governance 
2009 -  function 
Economic functions 
Focus: macro-economic 
and fiscal policies; debt 
and spending reduction 
functions/COFOG 
Performance budgets 
 
(Supranational) Macro-
Budgeting  
Spending reviews 
Fiscal rules 
 
  
7.7 Future challenges for budgeting scholars, practitioners and policy makers 
The above reflections show that public budgeting is multifaceted, in that it can be observed from 
different angles and points of views, and it is also a complex phenomenon, which shows significant 
variation across space and over time. In spite of this, a review of European literature points out 
that public budgeting has attracted scant consideration in public management and accounting 
research in Europe over the last thirty years (Anessi et al., 2016) with most contributions rather 
rooted in the grey literature, i.e being published as policy briefs or reports, rather than as articles 
in scientific journals. Also, it highlights that, in spite of the changes advocated for by managerial 
reform movements, changes in public budgeting, including shifts to performance-based and 
accruals-based budgeting, are still under way, or their expected benefits are yet to be fully reaped. 
The post-crisis and austerity context are further increasing the complexity of the budgeting 
context and processes, and, thus, it can be expected that in the years to come budgeters as well as 
public budgeting scholars will face new challenges. This section provides an overview of these 
likely challenges. 
 
7.7.1 Budget formats, processes and the changing environment 
In 1978 Wildavsky (1978, 508) suggested that the traditional line item budget had lasted long 
because it had “the virtues of its defects”, ie, it is easier, simpler, more flexible and more 
controllable than alternative models, which are usually designed to address a specific aim, on 
which they score particularly well, but which will then tend to be unsatisfactory to attain other 
aims.  
Is this still the case in the wake of the transformations occurring at the outset of the XXIst 
century? Managerial reforms have suggested the move to an increased reliance on accruals- and 
performance- based budgets. However, the integration of financial and non-financial aspects of 
performance, and of budgeting and performance management still remains a puzzle for many 
reformers and budgeters. Indeed, an increasing body of literature shows that accruals data are not 
necessarily preferred by either managers or politicians (for a review of relevant literature, see 
Liguori et al., 2012, 2014), as non-financial performance measures and cash-based data may 
appeal more to their users’ needs. In this respect, some authors suggest that the accruals basis of 
accounting may be useful for reporting and as an analytical tool, but still may not be needed as a 
basis for budgeting (Caiden, 2010, in discussing Schick’s work). Thus, while the literature on the 
adoption of accruals accounting has become increasingly wide, much less attention has been 
devoted so far, both in the literature and in practice, to how accruals-based budgeting should 
work and actually works, or at its impacts for political as well as managerial decision making (for a 
few notable exceptions, see Ezzamel et al., 2007; Hyndman and Connolly, 2011). 
Similarly, the integration of financial and non-financial performance goals still remain 
challenging for budgeters, both in the formulation and execution stages of budgeting. The actual 
use of performance data to feed this process still remains a puzzle for scholars and policy makers 
alike. This raises not only the need to further investigate (performance) information processing 
capacities of different actor groups but also to consider different types of uses of performance 
information. More generally, as in the past political and managerial processes have often been 
looked at separately, even by different disciplines, there is a need to devote increased attention to 
how such processes intertwines and influence each other also considering the multiple 
rationalities and logics, i.e. managerial/administrative and political, that are at play.  
The austerity phase that started after the 2008 global crisis appears to have sharpened 
these difficulties. In general, the banking, economic and – in many EU countries - fiscal crises and 
the rise of the ideology of austerity observable during the period 2009-15 may have caused a re-
centralization of processes, and the induced increased uncertainty and turbulence may have 
resulted in fragmented decision making and the need of continuous changes and adjustments to 
budgets, in their formulation as well as in their execution. This signals the need for practitioners 
and scholars to devote more attention to how fiscal rules and constraints, and a search for stability 
in public finances (macro-budgeting), can go hand in hand, or even require, increased flexibility in 
budget execution (micro-budgeting).  
More specifically, as Bracci et al (2015) point out, the NPM official rhetoric was about 
promoting the principles of the market, encouraging competition, results-oriented behavior, the 
quantification of performance and an emphasis on value-for-money. Austerity (particularly in the 
European Union) appears to have brought about an evident shift in accountability relationships 
and meanings. Under austerity, the attention has shifted to macro-data such as debt/GDP and 
deficit/GDP ratios, debt ceilings, balanced budgets (ie, macro-budgeting). Euro-zone countries 
have introduced balanced-budget amendments in their Constitutions (or adopted similar 
“domestic implementation laws”) and strengthened the chain of budgetary accountability across 
tiers of government. There is now a greater emphasis on the state of public finances at the 
country-level, rather than at an organizational level, while ‘non-financial’ aspects have been 
marginalized: On the one hand, austerity appears to have encouraged prioritization of services and 
policies, thus requiring the simultaneous consideration of the financial and non-financial aspects 
of public services. At the same time, it may have emphasized financial constraints and/or goals at 
the expense of the non-financial ones, thus strengthening the traditional focus on money and cash 
in the budget process. Indeed, austerity appears, in many countries (see also Bracci et al., 2015) to 
have meant a stronger focus on centralized financial and fiscal decision making, reversing the 
effects or intentions of the managerial move of former reforms, which were rather aimed at 
strengthening decentralized decision making, and refocusing the attention also on the 
effectiveness and quality of services.  
These developments suggest that we may soon face the paradox that Wildavsky 
highlighted in the 1980ies, whereby budget reforms that were introduced under the managerial 
movement with the aim of strengthening managerial accountability and result orientation may 
find application in a significantly changed context and thus be potentially at odds with new 
budgeters’ needs. It will thus be interesting to explore whether the managerial reforms of the 
1980ies, 1990ies and partly the 2000ies have provided better performing budget documents to 
public sector organizations or, rather, they have left them worse equipped to face difficult times.  
 
7.7.2 Co-production, citizens’ participation and external accountability   
Public sector managerial reform initiatives have increasingly emphasized the importance of 
accountability towards external stakeholders (Steccolini, 2004) as well as of their involvement and 
participation in decision making processes and service delivery (Bovaird, 2007). From a budgeting 
point of view, external accountability and participation require not only clear and comprehensive 
communication, but also forms of citizen and stakeholder involvement and participation, despite 
the obvious challenges posed by the virtual absence of interest by many stakeholders, and 
especially external ones (see, for example, Jones and Pendlebury, 2010; Mack and Ryan, 2007; 
Steccolini, 2004;). This stimulates an interest in looking at how budgeting processes can support 
co-production logics and processes, for example through forms of participatory budgeting. 
Participatory budgeting is different from traditional budgeting processes (Wildavsky, 1964; Rubin, 
2010), where decisions are made by elected or other government officials, that is, where citizens’ 
choices are mediated through their representatives. Participatory budgeting requires citizens to be 
directly involved in budgeting processes and responsible for decisions about budget allocations 
(Allegretti and Herzberg, 2004; Pinnington et al., 2009), and to ensure conditions of interaction, 
inclusiveness, responsiveness and representation in the whole process (Barbera et al., 
forthcoming).   
 
7.7.3 Budgeting, public governance and inter-organizational arrangements  
As public service delivery increasingly requires the involvement of multiple actors, including other 
governments or public sector entities, as well as private and nonprofit organizations, this has 
important implications for budgeting. On the one hand, this has produced new, often hybrid 
organizational forms; on the other hand, it entails the development of practices and processes 
that ensure the proper running of these hybrid forms and, thus, the effective provision of services. 
While hybrid organizational forms have attracted sufficient scholarly attention, the need exists to 
further investigate the hybrid practices and processes (Miller et al., 2008) that facilitate 
information flows and coordination across organizational boundaries. Budgeting plays a major role 
in the allocation of resources and responsibilities, as well as in the discharge of accountability in 
inter-organizational relationships. As such, the increasing importance of the relationships involving 
public, private, and nonprofit organizations requires a deeper analysis of the development, use, 
and impacts of such new tools as pooled or consolidated budgets, as well as a better 
understanding of the factors affecting the choice and design of the related practices and 
processes.  
At the same time, the increasing attention that is being devoted to the European fiscal 
governance, the willingness to put public finances “under (central) control” point to the budgets as 
central in mediating the relationships between member states and inter- or supra-national 
institutions, between national, intermediate, and local governments, and among governments of 
the same level. This has important implications. On the one hand, while international standards 
for financial reporting have existed for long in the private sector, and have increasingly been 
developed, though do not necessarily applied, for the public sector (not without criticism, for 
example Grossi and Steccolini, 2015), the same has not happened with budgeting standards. Only 
in the new century the debate about harmonization of public sector accounting standards (see 
chapter by Cohen at al., this volume) has been extended to budgets and budgeting. However, as 
much as there is controversy when public sector accounting standards are concerned, this may 
extend to budgeting ones. On the other hand, and more generally, this suggests that budgeting 
cannot be seen merely as a series of documents, and processes, but, especially in the European 
arena, must be increasingly seen as the complex, multifaceted and inherently technical language 
central in mediating the relationships across actors, institutions, generations by virtue of its 
political, accountability, managerial and economic functions.  
 
7.8. Conclusion 
Traditionally, budgeting has been the process through which governments decide how 
much to spend on what, limiting expenditures to the revenues available and preventing 
overspending. Over time, budgeting has increasingly been expected to perform different roles and 
functions, becoming an important political medium, a tool for providing impulses to the economy 
and the society, a fundamental governance and management device, and a central accountability 
channel. This multiplicity of functions has translated into a variety of budget formats and bases, 
and in increasingly complex budgeting processes.  This chapter has intended to explore how this 
multiplicity of functions is reflected in different formats, bases and principles of budgetary 
documents and in increasingly complex budgetary decision-making processes. Moreover, possible 
future challenges for practice, policy and research by taking into specific account European 
context, developments and trends have been highlighted and discussed. 
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